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1CHAPTER 13
Universality and Diversity in
the Vocalization of Emotions
Jörg Zinken, Monja Knoll, and Jaak Panksepp
Introduction
There is no doubt that prosodic channels
play an important part in emotional com-
munication (Bachorowski & Owren,
1995; Frick, 1985;Viscovich et al., 2003).
A relationship between emotional expe-
riences and acoustic properties of vocal-
ization was already suggested by Darwin
(1872), and it finds support from primate
research (Jürgens, 2006).
The aim of this paper is to discuss 
universals in the vocal expression of
emotion. In particular, we will share per-
spectives on the theoretical modeling of
universality and diversity underlying
research in this field. Our analysis will 
be based on diverse lines of evidence
emerging from an increasingly substan-
tial body of empirical research. Results
from this research show an ambiguous
picture, but they are most frequently
interpreted as confirmation for the exis-
tence of universal mechanisms in the
vocal communication of emotions. This
research, briefly summarized in the first
section, provides the background for dis-
cussions in the remainder of the chapter.
In the second section, we scrutinize 
the notions of universality and diversity
framing much of the current debate. In
particular, we argue that misleading jux-
tapositions of universality versus diver-
sity still seem to underlie the design and
interpretation of empirical studies. Pro-
posals for an alternative framing of uni-
versality and diversity are provided in
the third section. In particular, we argue
that universals of different types of affect
vocalization need to be studied within
their respective semiotic systems. The
symptomatic communication of raw
affect can be studied to discover evolved
acoustic action patterns. Such patterns are
continuous across species, and universal
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across human communities. However,
research into the cross-cultural recogniz-
ability of emotion from the voice has
used speech stimuli obtained by asking
speakers (mostly professional actors) to
pose various emotions. Such iconic com-
munication of affect can be studied as an
aspect of advanced sign use in humans.
Such sign use is diverse across cultures,but
becomes universal in histories of engage-
ment. In the fourth section, we discuss
new questions that such a perspective
brings into view, and we close with a set
of conclusions in the fifth section.
Universality and Diversity in
the Vocalization of Emotions:
An Overview of 
Empirical Research
Results from Cross-Cultural
Recognition Studies
The vocal expression of emotions has
not received nearly as much attention as
the facial expression of emotions. This is
all the more true for analysis of universal-
ity and diversity in the vocal expression
of emotions. Nevertheless, there is now
a growing body of empirical research
addressing these questions, including
meta-analyses (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002;
Juslin & Laukka, 2003).1
2 VOICE AND EMOTION: VOLUME 1
Empirical research on the universality
of vocal expression of emotions has
largely focused on the ability of raters to
recognize emotions expressed in speech
samples produced by a member of a dif-
ferent culture (e.g., Albas, McCluskey, &
Albas, 1976; Bezooijen, Otto, & Heenan,
1983; Scherer, Banse, & Wallbott, 2001).2,3
Recognition studies consistently show
an ambiguous picture. Virtually all stud-
ies report that emotions are recognized
from voice with above-chance accuracy
across cultures (Elfenbein & Ambady,
2002). At the same time, all studies show
that the accuracy of recognition decreases
with the cultural distance between the
speaker and the rater (Elfenbein &
Ambady, 2002; Scherer et al., 2001).
These results have received widely 
differing interpretations, depending on
whether the authors were interested in
universality or in diversity. For example,
Scherer and his colleagues (Scherer,
1999a; 1999b; Scherer et al., 2001) tend
to interpret the literature as providing
support for the existence of a universal
core of mechanisms for inferring emo-
tions from the voice. Beside the fact that
emotions are recognized with above-
chance accuracy across cultures, they
have found a similarity in confusion pat-
terns. For example, the vocal expression
of fear by a German-speaking actor was
most frequently mistaken for sadness
rather than any other emotion by both
1In most cases, cross-cultural studies of emotion recognition identify language with culture, so that the con-
trasted “cultural” groups are defined by the native languages. However, this is not always the case. In some
studies, culture has been defined ethnically or geographically (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). The results have
been similar to those where cross-linguistic diversity was studied. For example, Australian speakers of English
were worse than American speakers of English at recognizing emotions from the voice of an American speaker.
2These studies aim to investigate people’s ability to recognize emotion from voice. However, given the design
of these studies, which require participants to choose an emotion from a list of alternatives, it seems more
appropriate to interpret the results as indicating an ability to discriminate between emotions (Frick, 1985).
3The study of recognition of emotions bears parallels with the extensive literature on basic color terms using
Munsell color chips: participants are asked to apply a local label to an array of foreign stimuli. It has been
argued that this methodology produces rather than uncovers conceptual universals (Saunders, 1995).
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German and Indonesian raters (Scherer
et al., 2001).
However, the same results also indi-
cate a systematic relation between cul-
tural proximity and accuracy of emotion
recognition. Notably, vocal expression 
of emotion by German-speaking actors
in the study by Scherer and colleagues
(2000) was recognized most accurately
by speakers of German, less accurately by
speakers of other Germanic languages
(Dutch, English), less accurately still by
speakers of other Indo-European lan-
guages (French, Italian), and least accu-
rately by speakers of the only non-Indo-
European language included, Bahasa
Indonesia.4 Although Indonesian raters
still achieved above-chance accuracy,
their accuracy rates were significantly
lower than those of the German-speaking
participants. Some evidence also suggests
that the similarity in confusion patterns
decreases with linguistic-cultural distance
between speakers and raters. In a study
on emotion recognition from the voice
of English speakers by English, Spanish,
and Japanese raters, the confusions in the
judgments by Spanish speakers were
similar to those of English raters, whereas
those of Japanese raters were more dissim-
ilar (Graham, Hamblin, & Feldstein, 2001).
The diversity evident from these stud-
ies becomes even more interesting when
we take into account that the languages
and cultures studied so far are not actu-
ally very diverse. For example, the most
extensive cross-linguistic study in this
area seems to be Scherer et al. (2001),
who asked speakers of seven languages
from nine countries to rate the emotions
expressed in voice samples produced 
by German-speaking actors. However, of
the seven languages included, six were
Indo-European languages. With approxi-
mately 6000 languages currently spoken
around the globe, this is hardly a repre-
sentation of actual linguistic diversity,
and it is unclear what conclusions about
universality can be drawn from such a
narrow and relatively homogeneous sam-
ple of languages.
Furthermore, only a few specific emo-
tions have been studied systematically,
and these usually relate to the different
extant proposals regarding “basic” emo-
tions. If universal mechanisms exist that
guide the recognition of emotion from
voice, or the vocal expression of emo-
tion, these should surely exist for basic
emotions. Given this restriction to a few
basic emotions, the ambiguity of the
results from recognition studies seems
quite surprising. We would not expect
such a result if the vocal expression of
these emotions was itself grounded in
universal mechanisms.5
An interpretation de-emphasising uni-
versal mechanisms might suggest that
what these results show is the degree of
familiarity of raters with the speaker’s
4The only exception from this genetic trend was French-speaking Swiss, who achieved better recognition rates
than speakers of Germanic languages (Dutch, English). The authors suggest that this is because of the fact
that most Swiss speakers of French have some knowledge of German. More specifically, we would argue that
it is the communication histories between French-speaking and German-speaking Swiss that leads to this
result; cf. section The Relation between Universality and Diversity: A Systems Model.
5Indeed, when humans are asked to express a single word, such as mom or any other single-syllable word in
four basic emotional intonations (happy, sad, angry, and scared), the forced choice emotional detection rate
approaches 100% in American students (greater than 90% in four separate studies, Panksepp, 1985–1991,
unpublished data). However, such emotional sounds could not be distinguished from EEG recordings from
the cortical surface processed with sophisticated Event Related Desynchronization signal-detection algo-
rithms, probably because the recording sites were far from the source generators (Panksepp, 2000).
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culture. This notion is also supported by
a much earlier study that was concerned
with the effects of familiarity on the
enhancement of emotion recognition
within the same culture (Hornstein,
1967). It was found that the prosodic
emotional communication between com-
patible college roommates improved
during the first 3 months of living
together. In contrast, incompatible room-
mates’ emotional communication did not
improve. In the remainder of the article,
we will argue that recognition studies
utilizing posed emotions can address
such “developing universals,” but not
evolved universal “mechanisms.”
Results from Cross-Cultural
Studies on Infant-Directed Speech
Another area that has sought to combine
research into prosody and emotional
responsivity is that of speech directed to
infants (e.g., Burnham, Kitamura, &
Vollmer-Conna, 2002; Fernald, 1989; Fer-
nald & Simon, 1984; Kuhl, 1994). The
prosody of infant-directed speech (IDS)
has been extensively analyzed and is
characterized by higher pitch, exagger-
ated pitch contours, hyperarticulation of
vowels, shorter utterances, and longer
pauses (Burnham et al., 2002; Fernald 
& Simon, 1984; Stern, Spieker, Barnett, &
MacKain, 1983; Trainor, Austin, & Des-
jardins, 2000). Independent raters of
such speech perceived high positive
emotional affect (Burnham et al., 2002;
Kitamura & Burnham, 2003). These
prosodic modifications are generally
assumed to be universal, and several
cross-cultural studies have found support
for this (e.g., Fernald al, 1989; Kuhl,
2000; Scherer et al., 2001).
4 VOICE AND EMOTION: VOLUME 1
As a large proportion of research into
IDS deals with the analysis of natural
interactions, specific emotions (e.g., hap-
piness, sadness) have rarely been ad-
dressed; instead content-filtered speech
samples are normally rated for general-
ized emotional affect (such as positive,
negative). What makes IDS an extremely
relevant case study for the discussion of
the expression of vocal emotion is the
prelinguistic stage of the infant. This
vocal expression of emotion toward
infants is only possible through the mod-
ification of prosodic channels, as the lex-
ical content of IDS is presumably not
understood at this developmental stage.
A second reason why we have decided
to include IDS in this discussion is the
fundamental assumption of universality
in this area.
This viewpoint of universality is often
maintained regardless of the fact that dif-
ferences are apparent across cultures.
For instance, differences were found in
the way mothers express vocal affect
between Australian English and Thai
(Kitamura, Thanavishuth, Burnham, &
Luksaneeyanawin, 2002). Thai is a tonal
language, in which pitch is used to con-
vey lexical meaning. Kitamura et al.
(2002) found that Thai mothers com-
pared to Australian English mothers
restricted their pitch excursions in order
to not disrupt tonal information. The
authors concluded that instead of using
heightened pitch to convey emotional
affect as found in the English speaking
mothers, Thai mothers may use different
vocal characteristics (final particles to
express mood and status) and maybe
increased affective linguistic content.
Similarly, pitch contours in Mandarin
Chinese (another tonal language) IDS 
are less exaggerated than in American
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English IDS and are more similar to adult-
directed speech (ADS) in Mandarin Chi-
nese (Papousek & Hwang, 1991). This
study also compared both IDS and ADS
to foreign-directed speech (FDS), and
interestingly found that Mandarin Chinese
FDS had more exaggerated pitch contours
than both IDS and ADS. In contrast to
this, British English mothers’ FDS does
not show the same exaggerated pitch
contours, and was found to be more 
similar to ADS, while IDS exhibited exag-
gerated pitch contours (Knoll, Walsh,
MacLeod, O’Neill, & Uther, 2007). This
shows that exaggerated pitch contours
in tonal languages might have a different,
more linguistic function compared to the
nontonal languages, and we can therefore
not assume that these acoustic features
per se are indices of certain emotional
states across all cultures. Many more
examples of these slight but important
differences in prosodic modifications
across cultures in IDS exist. Japanese IDS
has lower, less exaggerated pitch values
than American IDS, but this is obviated
by a higher affective linguistic content
(Toda, Fogel, & Kawai, 1990; Viscovich
et al., 2003). Another language that also
exhibits lower pitch values in IDS but
higher pitch values in ADS is Quiche
(Mayan language, Bernstein Ratner & Pye,
1984). The authors explained their find-
ings in terms of the utilization of pitch as
an indication of status rather than affect.
The important aspect here is first that
IDS shows slight differences in prosodic
modifications across cultures, and that
universality of the vocal expression of
emotions per se can therefore not be
completely maintained. We also suggest
that prosodic modifications, regardless
of how they are perceived by independ-
ent raters, might have a variety of differ-
ent functions. For instance, in the case of
the British English FDS, raters perceived
low-pass filtered speech samples of FDS
as more negative than ADS despite 
similar pitch contours and pitch values.
The only difference that was found
between those two speech conditions
was the aforementioned hyperarticula-
tion of vowels, which should have a lin-
guistic but not an emotional function
(Knoll & Uther, 2004). The research into
IDS shows that regardless of features
held in common in IDS across cultures,
there are also differences that cannot be
discounted and which would require an
alternative, less simplistic explanation
than the common universality versus
diversity debate can offer.
The Relation between
Universality and Diversity:
Linear Models
Similarities and differences are both evi-
dent in the recognition of vocal expres-
sions of emotion across cultures. This
has been interpreted as showing that the
vocal expression of emotions itself has
both cross-culturally universal and diverse
facets. Similarly, the acoustic properties
of IDS show both similarities and differ-
ences across cultures. It seems then that
instead of asking whether emotional
expression is universal or diverse we
should ask questions about the relation-
ship between universality and diversity
in emotional expression. This statement
seems to be uncontentious and is en-
dorsed so commonly in the introduction
sections of research articles (e.g., Scherer
et al., 2001) that it might even seem like
a “shallow platitude” (Ellsworth, 1994).
13_Izdebski_Vol1_  9/30/07  1:17 PM  Page 5
However, explicit metatheoretical dis-
cussions of what we imagine the relation
between universality and diversity to be
are comparatively sparse (Manstead &
Fischer, 2002).
We will argue in this section that the
relation between universality and diver-
sity has been modeled, more implicitly
than explicitly, as the two poles of a sin-
gle continuum.6 This model is evident in
the conviction underlying much of the
empirical literature that if we find simi-
larities in behavior across raters, then
this will diminish the existence or at least
the relevance of diversity. It is evident,
conversely, in the argument that if we
can illustrate diversity across cultures,
then this decreases the convincingness,
or relevance, of theories assuming the
existence of universals. These if-then
arguments are only valid if we can think
of the truth about the expression of emo-
tions as a point moving between the two
poles on a continuum, or between two
scales, so that an increase in universality
necessarily decreases diversity and vice
versa. A continuum model is also evident
in some interpretations of differences in
6 VOICE AND EMOTION: VOLUME 1
the recognizability of different emotions.
For example, van Bezooijen and col-
leagues found that some emotions, such
as sadness, were fairly well recognized
from the voice across cultures, whereas
others, such as joy, were relatively poorly
recognized (Bezooijen et al., 1983).
They concluded that some emotions are
expressed in culturally specific ways,
whereas others are universally expressed
in the same way; in other words, emo-
tions can fall on different places along a
universality-diversity continuum.
A continuum model is evident also in
the way universality and diversity may
come together in the process of the vocal
expression of emotions. This process is
sometimes imagined as a sequential
motion along the continuum, as repre-
sented in Figure 13–1.
The basic opposition between a uni-
versal and a diverse pole is here supple-
mented with a vertical metaphor: the
evaluation of diverse practices being a
surface behavior that is initiated by uni-
versal underlying mechanisms.The vocal
expression of emotion is imagined to be
initiated by universal evolved mecha-
universal
mechanisms
diverse display rules
Figure 13–1. The expression of emotions as a sequence from universal to
local steps.
6The figures discussed in this section are not intended as reconstructions of anybody’s explicit theoretical
views. Rather, they are meant as reconstructions of the nontechnical models and assumptions that underlie
explicit scientific thinking (Black, 1962).
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nisms. In a second step, this expression
is adapted to local, potentially diverse,
display rules. This sequential model is
evident, for example, in Scherer’s meta-
phors of push and pull effects. Physiolog-
ical changes in the organism constitute
the push effects that initiate a vocal
expression of emotion. Pull effects sub-
sequently work on this expression to
“suppress,”“amplify,” or “modify” it accord-
ing to local display rules (Scherer, 1999b).
This model is also evident in the his-
torical development of a division of labor
between academic disciplines in the study
of the expression of emotions. Much of
the psychological literature treats the
interest in diversity of emotional expres-
sion as belonging to the realm of anthro-
pology and ethnology, which study local
practices of showing emotions. Psychol-
ogists, on the other hand, have identified
their subject as the universal mecha-
nisms of emotion expression, which are
thought of as an evolved potential that is
itself universally shared across cultures,
and possibly across species.
Accordingly, the interest in universal-
ity and the interest in diversity are effec-
tively conceptualized as two distinct
enterprises concerned with the different
ends of the continuum. Interest in univer-
sality goes with a focus on evolved mech-
anisms, and interest in diversity goes with
a focus on local practice.These views can
be brought together by considering uni-
versality and diversity on different levels
of generality. For example, the intrinsic
capacities for infant musicality can lead to
a host of culture specific learning princi-
ples that help weave a child into its local
social ecology (Trevarthen, 2000).
Nevertheless, many authors still frame
the debate as concerning universality
versus diversity (e.g., Elfenbein & Ambady,
2002; Scherer, 2000), even when they
explicitly acknowledge the importance
of accommodating both universality and
diversity. It seems that the research tradi-
tions of being either interested primarily
in universals or in diversity are so strong
that they still frame the current debate.
The continuum model can account for
the empirical findings in the sense that it
is able to incorporate both universality
and diversity. However, this does not make
it an appropriate model, and we will now
consider that there are some problems
associated with it. The model suggests
that we can uncover universally evolved
mechanisms of vocal emotion expres-
sion by identifying areas of overlap in the
behavior (mostly recognition behavior)
of members of different cultures. Those
emotions for which we can find satisfy-
ing degrees of overlap (whatever these
are) are emotions for which universal
mechanisms of vocal expression exist.
We have stripped away the diversity and
identified the universal core.
We believe that this research strategy
is not justified as long as intentional emo-
tion portrayals are used.The reason is that
intentional vocal communication and
vocal affect bursts belong to two different
semiotic systems (Borod, 2000). Affec-
tive vocalizations shared across species,
which can be described as evolved uni-
versal mechanisms, belong to a sympto-
matic system. Posed emotion portrayals,
on the other hand, require advanced abil-
ities of sign use and belong to an iconic
system. Both systems have their univer-
sals, but the relation between overlap in
behavior in one system, and the struc-
ture and functions of the other system, is
not as straightforward as the continuum
model suggests.We will elaborate on this
contention in the next section.
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The Relation between
Universality and Diversity: 
A Systems Model
In this section, we want to spell out an
alternative model of the relation between
universal and diverse factors in the vocal
expression of emotions, represented in
Figure 13–2. Again, this figure is not
intended as a technical model, but as a
figurative handle for the following dis-
cussion. In particular, we do not suggest,
as it might seem from the figure: (a) that
affect bursts occur independently of
context; (b) that evolved universals are
independent of evolving universals.
The gist of this model is that it sepa-
rates affect burst behavior (the affective
system) from intentional communicative
behavior (the communicative system).
Evolved mechanisms implicated in vocal
bursts of emotion are part of the ancient
affective systems that humans share with
other primates and possibly other mam-
mals (Panksepp & Bernatzky, 2002).
There is presently little doubt that there
are intrinsic emotional-vocal control
8 VOICE AND EMOTION: VOLUME 1
mechanisms in the mammalian brain,
with a great deal of cross-species coher-
ence (Hauser, 1996; Jürgens, 1998).Vocal
communication of emotions builds on
the acoustics of affect bursts, but univer-
sality of such communication cannot be
attributed to, and should not be sought
in, just evolved mechanisms. In what fol-
lows we present this argument in more
detail, discussing universality first in the
affective system, and then in the commu-
nicative system.
Affect Vocalizations as Evolved
Action Systems: Figure 13–2(a)
Emotional vocalizations occurring in all
mammals can be described as evolved
action systems (Panksepp, 1982; 2005). It
would seem that such vocalizations, indic-
ative of affective states experienced by
other mammals, should also be a natural
part of the vocal repertoire of the human
species. These action systems would be
part of what Scherer calls push effects.
Affective vocalizations might not so
much relate to cognitive aspects of emo-
(a) (b) (c)
symptomatic affective action system iconic communicative system
affect burst
interpretation
simulation
conventionalization
conventional icon
attention
Evolved universals Evolving universals
Figure 13–2. Systems model of the vocal expression of emotion.
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tions such as anger or happiness, but
rather to fundamental affective states
that are part and parcel of motivational
arousals shared by many species, states
that we can refer to in English with
words such as being enraged, joyous,
cold, lustful, etc. (Panksepp, 2005). Of
course, the terms of a particular lan-
guage might be associated with various
evaluations, expectations, or action
“scripts” (Wierzbicka, 1991) that might
be quite specific to that language. Never-
theless, we believe that many of the raw
feelings that exist beyond words are
shared across human cultures and across
species. It is the symptomatic vocal ex-
pression of fundamental affective states,
rather than the iconic vocal communica-
tion of emotions, that we would expect
to exhibit similarities in acoustic proper-
ties across cultures (Juslin & Laukka,
2003; Panksepp & Bernatzky, 2002).
The recognizability of such raw emo-
tional sounds is also reasonable from 
the point of view that certain emotional
(or affective) states are associated with
distinct physiological changes such as
increased muscle tension and sympathetic
arousal. For instance, tension in both the
respiratory and laryngeal muscles can
lead to louder and higher pitched speech
(Frick, 1985).These physiological changes
would presumably occur cross-culturally
during the expression of certain affective
states if these were accompanied by
increased muscle tension and subse-
quent sympathetic arousal.
The existence of intrinsic brains cir-
cuits for a variety of basic emotions,
which can yield vocal outputs (Jürgens,
1998), from essentially the same subcor-
tical brain regions in all mammalian
species that have been studied (New-
man, 1988) provides powerful testimony
for the existence of intrinsic emotional
vocal control in all mammals. Perhaps
the most compelling example is the
squeal of pain. However, one critical
question is whether these sounds are
communicatory or merely by-products
of emotional expressions.
There is increasing animal data that
many of these sounds do contribute to
communication and infection of emo-
tional states among interacting animals.
For instance, happy laughter type 50 kHz
chirps in rats facilitate social and sexual
choices (Burgdorf & Panksepp, 2006),
and 22 kHz distress calls reduce the like-
lihood that colony members will leave
burrows to explore and forage.The infan-
tile separation-distress vocalizations in
many species motivate maternal retrieval
and attention, and hence have clear sur-
vival value (Panksepp, 2003). It is not
hard to imagine that such emotional
sounds, even after enculturation, will still
have distinct kinds of emotional impact
even in highly encephalized species
where learned display rules tend to over-
ride instinctual ones. Indeed, it does
remain possible that the roots of cultural
practices such as musical expressions of
emotions still rely on our capacities for
making and appreciating intrinsic emo-
tional sounds (Panksepp & Bernatzky,
2002) as our capacity to mold such raw
materials into complex communications
through the engines of culture.
Symptomatic vocalizations might be
difficult to study in humans. One reason
for this is the methodological difficulty
of using words relating to complex cate-
gories such as joy or sadness in an
attempt to study nonlinguistic affective
states. Another reason is that human
societies seem to impose constraints on
the expression of affective states, so that
humans, at least adults, have a tendency
to cover up these states to make their
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vocal expressions socially acceptable (cf.
Scherer’s notion of pull effects).The final
usage or contribution of these acoustic
cues to the communication of emotions
would differ depending on cultural con-
ventionalization processes, which could
be very diverse, depending on how dif-
ferent cultures viewed the propriety and
usefulness of emotional frankness.
Societal restrictions in the form of dis-
play rules are therefore one factor in the
development of diversity. However, such
social expectations are not the only, and
probably not the fundamental, factor that
leads to a diversity of vocal expression of
emotions across cultures. The influence
of society on human behavior is not a
purely negative, constraining one. Rather,
the motive for communication itself
leads people to modify their voice, as we
will argue in the following sections.
Thus, as soon as intentionality becomes
part of communication, diversity begins
to impose new levels of complexity
upon universality.
Attention to and Interpretation of
Natural Signs (Symptoms): 
Figure 13–2(b) and (c)
Whereas the ancient affective action sys-
tems that produce affect bursts are very
hard to study in the human species, this
is not the case for the acoustic percept
that an affect burst produces. The cogni-
tive significance of vocal expression of
emotion lies in the fact that the expres-
sion can be attended to and so itself be-
comes an input into cognitive processes
(Jackendoff, 1996). When the acoustic
percept produced in an affect burst is
attended to, either by the producing
10 VOICE AND EMOTION: VOLUME 1
organism itself or by another, we leave
the system of affect burst behavior, and
intrinsic communication, and enter the
systems of intentional communicative
behavior.
As a communicative process, the
vocal expression of an emotional state is
not the endpoint, but rather the starting
point. It has been implicitly assumed in
the research that others understand the
expressed emotion in a natural way,
maybe because they possess the same
mechanisms for expressing emotion
vocally, or because of the existence of
universal “inference rules” (Scherer, 2003)
that allow receivers to infer vocalizers’
emotional states from vocal cues. How-
ever, we must keep in mind that the nat-
uralness of an expression does not make
its interpretation natural. Although a
vocal expression with particular acoustic
qualities might be a natural symptom of
a particular affective state in all humans
(and beyond), the interpretation of the
expression as a symptom is not naturally
given.7 In order for a particular acoustic
percept to be interpreted as an expres-
sion of happiness, the expression has to
be attended to and understood. While
this understanding might indeed be pos-
sible due to evolved inference systems in
the case of the vocalization of raw affec-
tive states, human vocal communication
of emotions clearly goes beyond that.
Imitation and the
Conventionalization of Vocal
Icons: Figure 13–2(b) and (c)
The vocalization of emotions in humans
is not restricted to symptomatic expres-
sion. Most of the time, vocal expression
7Although fever has always been a natural expression (a symptom) of an inflammation in the organism, this
interpretation of fever required the development of medical knowledge (Rodriguez, in press).
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of emotions in humans, and possibly
some other primates, also has an appeal
function (Scherer, 1992).That is, humans
use the voice in order to do something,
in order to achieve a change in the state
of others. Humans intentionally use their
voices for communication. An under-
standing of the reasons for universality
and diversity in vocal communication in
humans therefore ultimately requires us to
investigate the evolution of this communi-
cation system in its mutuality with (a) the
intertwined evolution of voluntary control
over vocalizations and of the phonatory
apparatus (Ploog, 1992) on the one hand,
and with (b) the evolution of understand-
ing other minds on the other hand.
Crucially, in explaining possible uni-
versals as well as diversity in human
vocal communication of emotions, we
can no longer refer to evolved mecha-
nisms. The reason for this is the flexibil-
ity inherent in the processes of imitation
and conventionalization. This flexibility
is due to the fact that any actual speech
event is more complex than the proper-
ties that become semiotically interpreted
by a listener (Bühler, 1934/1982). For
example, the vocal expression of happi-
ness involves communication through a
variety of acoustic channels (e.g., Frick,
1985), such as pitch, rate, tension, etc.
The interpretation of a vocal affect
expression as expressing a happy state
can become associated with one or sev-
eral of these channels in the processes 
of simulation and conventionalization,
coarsely represented in Figure 13–2(b)
and (c). The intentional vocal communi-
cation of emotion, while initially a simu-
lation of universal affect bursts, modifies
the acoustic percept in a multitude of
ways that cannot be reduced to social
repressions. The iconic expression con-
ventionally used in the vocal communi-
cation of an emotional state is con-
strained not only by societal rules, but
also by system-internal considerations.
For example, if the vocal simulations of
happiness and nervousness are similar
enough to be confused frequently, the
conventional vocal expression of one or
both of these emotions will change to
make them more distinguishable.8 This
means that the motive for engaging with
others through communication is itself a
driving force behind the development of
diversity. Such functional constraints are
themselves universal, but they have the
effect that overlap in the intentional
vocal behavior of adult speakers across
cultures will bear a complex relation to
evolved affect burst systems. This posi-
tive motive for local developments of
vocal communication is the reason why
diversity cannot just be peeled away to
reach a universal core. No known direct
link leads from one to the other. Indeed,
there may not exist one single path from
one to the other, since propositional
communication has a neural infrastruc-
ture of its own. Still there has to be some
kind of interconnection between the
two, perhaps in the fundamental motiva-
tional urge to communicate, which is
heavily represented in limbic social-brain
structures such as the anterior cingulate,
which also regulate social motivation.
However, it is worth considering that
even lower brain functions, such as the
seeking urge, driven by general purpose
dopaminergic motivational systems, is a
major force in promoting the desire to
communicate.
8The intentional use of voice in communication does not mean that changes in the conventional vocal 
expression of emotion are intended. Intentional actions on the individual level lead to unintended changes in
convention (Keller, 1994).
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Discussion
Universality and Diversity Do 
Not Exclude Each Other
The major consequence that follows
from the systems model we have sug-
gested is that universality and diversity
do not stand in opposition.
On the one hand, we are convinced
that many affective states are, on a pre-
conceptual level, shared by all humans.
These shared affective states are surely
more numerous than the modest six 
or so basic emotions often suggested as
universal. This universality, however,
does not at all diminish the fact that the
expression of emotion, as soon as it
involves elements of volition and creativ-
ity, might become very diverse across
cultures. What is more, this diversity is
not at all superficial, a package for a uni-
versal content. Rather, communication
processes, including vocal communica-
tion, are a major force in the develop-
ment of complex affective categories
such as happiness or despair that consti-
tute a culture’s “forms of life” (Brakel,
1994). Human utterances are more than
just expressions of a subjective state:
they give this state a form, and thus
enable its scrutiny and categorization
(Humboldt, 1835/1994; Jackendoff, 1996).
They become an input to cognitive and
communication processes.
Conversely, diversity does not at all
diminish the existence or relevance of
universals. Imagine two cultures in which
the conventionalization of the vocal
expression of happy affective states has
taken maximally diverse paths. Say, cul-
ture A has conventionalized increased
pitch variation as a signal of such states,
and has dramatized this acoustic prop-
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erty in vocal communication. Culture B
has conventionalized fast speech rate as
a signal of happy states, and has drama-
tized this acoustic property in vocal
communication. Here we have maximal
diversity: the two typical expressions 
of happiness do not overlap in terms of
their acoustic properties. Nevertheless,
if presented with vocal portrayals of hap-
piness from a member of culture B, a
member of culture A might still be able
to correctly identify the intended state,
because she will recognize it as a possi-
ble simulation of happy affect burst
vocalizations. This will be even more so
if she is faced with a choice between,
say, happiness, sadness, anger, and fear.
Diversity can be absolute—this does not
diminish the universal potential provided
by the acoustics of affect bursts.
In order to say anything about evolved
universals of affect burst vocalization,
those vocalizations have to be studied in
all their complexity, including neurolog-
ical substrates. Hence, studying affect
burst vocalization might be difficult in
humans, and simpler in other animals.
For instance, the topic is already being
addressed in primate research (Jürgens,
2006).The study of intentional vocal por-
trayal of emotions, on the other hand,
can address a different kind of univer-
sals. This is so because intentional vocal
communication is constrained by factors
that are not themselves related to the
affective system.
Developing Universals
The communicative model we have pre-
sented [Figure 13–2(b) and (c)] predicts
that overlap in the vocal expression of
communication develops through pro-
cesses of conventionalization, that is, in
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social contact. In this sense, universals 
of vocal communication of emotion are
developing as networks of communica-
tion expand. These are universals that
develop through histories of engagement.
In this sense, diversity is ultimately not
based in ethnic, geographical, or linguis-
tic factors, but perhaps mostly in lack of
mutual engagement. This is supported
by research showing that cross-cultural
recognition rates of vocal expression of
emotions increase with the increase 
of telephone contact between countries
(Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). It is also
consistent with the finding that within a
country, minority groups are better at
recognizing emotions expressed vocally
by majority group members than vice
versa (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002).
Research into universality and diver-
sity of vocal communication of emotion
should take histories of engagement
across groups into account.9 For instance,
the extent to which cross-cultural inter-
course is resulting in imitation of emo-
tional prosody should not be underes-
timated. People might consciously or
unconsciously mimic the prosody of inter-
locutors, particularly where continuous
engagement occurs, much in the manner
of a “phonetic chameleon.” However, this
appears to be presently untested.
Units of Analysis
The basic reservation we have about
much of the empirical research and its
interpretation can probably be summa-
rized thus. A communication system can-
not be properly understood if the units
of analysis are the individual, on the one
hand, and the society, on the other. We
also need to take the communicative
process as the unit of analysis. Dividing
individuals from society has, in the cur-
rent research context, led researchers
interested in universality to a fundamen-
tally negative view of communication
and sociality in general: what the public
context of emotional expression does is
to constrain the individual, place rules
on her behavior, and force her to sup-
press or modify emotional expression.
We have argued that this view conceals
many interesting questions about uni-
versality and diversity in the vocal
expression of emotions, for example, the
development of universality in histories
of engagement. This leads to two types
of universality (Marková, 1987) in affec-
tive vocalizations: evolved universals in
symptomatic systems, shared across
species, and developing commonalities
in iconic systems, shared within commu-
nities, which become universal as net-
works of communication expand.
Universals and Functionality
We might therefore reopen the question
of what it means if a behavior or psycho-
logical state is universal or not. Why
should vocal expressions of emotion be
universal anyway? The general point that
researchers interested in universality
wish to claim is that vocal expressions
9The fact that it is engagement in communication rather than just exposure to communication is supported
by a study showing that students of English as a second language with high proficiency in English were not
better at recognizing emotions vocally expressed by a native English speaker than students with low English
proficiency. The authors conclude that learning a foreign language in a classroom setting might not be suffi-
cient to become sensitive to this channel of communication.
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are universal because of phylogenetic
continuity (e.g., Scherer, 1999b). This
would mean that vocal expression of
emotion must be, and must have been,
an adaptive behavior, that is, it must be
functional. Its functionality determines
the properties of an emotional expression
(Darwin, 1872). However, in the sequence
model of vocal expression discussed in
the second section, the local display
rules also render vocal expression func-
tional. A more positive view of vocal
communication of emotion would sug-
gest that the community, the culture of
the speaker, is itself one of the environ-
mental systems that influence ongoing
social microevolution. In this perspec-
tive, then, there is mutuality, rather than
a unidirectional influence, between the
two systems discussed here: the emo-
tional-affective action systems and the
cognitive communicative systems.
Conclusions
Raw affective experiences are a gift of
nature; they are not cognitively penetra-
ble (Panksepp, 2005). However, the per-
cepts that result from vocalization are
penetrable for humans: they can be
attended to, repeated, reflected upon,
dramatized, etc. Diversity develops in
communication systems because expres-
sions of emotion involve multiple chan-
nels, including various cognitive ones,
but intentional vocalization might utilize
only a subsection of these. In situations
of fear the voice might become tense,
it might tremble, and so on. In attending
to the vocalization, a listener might pick
out one of the vocal qualities, and ulti-
mately a tense voice can become associ-
ated with fear in one group, whereas in
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another group a trembling voice is the
more typical expression of fear. Commu-
nication systems undergo processes of
conventionalization and change that are
in part independent from the universal
constraints of the affective system. Com-
munication is a way of engaging the
world that is distinct in principle from
such evolutionarily more basic systems
(Panksepp, 2005, p. 162).
The human voice comes to convey
many subtle changes in emotional state
—at least to somebody who has a history
of engagement with the speaker. It is
misleading to narrow down the universal
to only a handful of emotions, in the
hope that they will be the major way in
which emotionality is communicated 
in the voice. Rather, it seems to us that
there is a lot that is universal in the com-
munication of affective states, and at the
same time there is a lot that is diverse:
many affective states (tiredness, playful-
ness, exhilaration, fear, many shades of
distress, and many shades of joy) are
surely felt by all people (Panksepp,
2005). However, as soon as such states
are communicated, not to mention given
names and thus ordered into categories,
it is increasingly less fruitful to look at
these vocalizations for a universal core 
of emotionality. Emotions become semi-
otically formed in communication, and
emotions are easily recognizable from
the voice if hearer and speaker share a
history of using the same communication
system. For example, it is easy to recog-
nize contempt from the voice of a per-
son that one knows well. However, the
recognition of contempt has been very
low in recognition studies (Elfenbein &
Ambady, 2002).
What follows is that universality in the
vocal expression of emotions can be stud-
ied in two ways. Studies of biologically
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entrenched action systems might be
more successful with nonhuman animals
and very early stages of communication
development in our own species. Studies
of the vocal communication of emotions
in humans that have been or are becom-
ing enculturated might more fruitfully
focus on the development of universality
in histories of social engagement.
Models trying to incorporate both uni-
versality and diversity have taken the
form of unidirectional sequence models:
An emotional state triggers a universal
mechanism (a motor program for vocal
expression, for example), which is then
modulated according to local display
rules. Fundamentally, these models use
conduit-metaphors of communication
(Reddy, 1979/1993), where the basic
emotions are the substance that itself
remains untouched, and just becomes
wrapped into different cognitive-com-
municative packages by the local code
that needs to be decoded by the listener.
We have suggested an alternative model
that accommodates the ambiguous results
of empirical research and motivates new
questions about the universality and
diversity of vocal expressions of emotions.
Vocal expression of emotion is usually
studied as a natural sign, with a self-
evident meaning. However, the fact that
we can study the acoustic properties of
an auditory signal and establish acoustic
regularities does not mean that the mean-
ing of such a natural sign is self-evident.
The fact that a certain percept (such as a
particular pitch contour) is a natural
symptom of a state does not mean that it
is understood as a sign of this state. As
long as it is not clear what the relation is
between auditory perception and con-
scious states, the description of acoustic
properties cannot be used as a consis-
tent description of a meaning.
In sum, we have been arguing that
universals of iconic vocal emotional
communication develop in histories of
engagement. If such a process of devel-
oping universals exists, it must necessar-
ily build on yet other universal potentials
of the brain and mind. One of these
potentials is accessible in the acoustics
of affect bursts. Others have to be found
in consistent patterns of social cogni-
tion, which may become increasingly
complex with increasingly complex
manmade environments. Presumably, the
universal tendencies that govern social
cognition would have less variability in
humans still living in natural environ-
ments, but they may vary substantially
depending upon the ecological factors
of those environments. Future research
might attempt to address the develop-
ment of universals in the intersubjective
engagements that emerge in different
sociocultural contexts and world envi-
ronments, and the relation between such
developing universals and evolved vocal
action patterns.
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